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CHAPTER 1

The Communal Dilemma as a Cultural Resource in Hungarian Political Expression

David Boromisza-Habashi

Let us begin with a seemingly simple question: how does public expression become political expression? There are simple, commonsense answers to this question. For example, when professional politicians speak in public, what they say constitutes political expression. When someone speaks publicly in an institutional setting commonly recognized as political—at a political rally, in a congressional committee meeting, or in the general assembly of a nation's parliament—we regard their speech as political expression. Public expression addressing political matters is also generally regarded as political talk. Often, the identity of the speaker, the institutional setting, and the topic of expression are indeed reliable indicators that political expression is taking place. However, there are cases in which the political nature of expression is less obvious. Consider the widely publicized "private" conversation between the presidents of France and the United States at the G20 meeting in November 2011. Oblivious to an open microphone in their vicinity, President Sarkozy referred to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu as a "liar," and President Obama complained about "having to deal with" Netanyahu "every day." Once made public, did the utterances of these prominent political figures constitute political expression? Or when the president of the United States acknowledges an invited "ordinary citizen" during a State of the Union address and the citizen smiles, is that smile political speech? What about high school debaters addressing political issues

like national defense and foreign policy at a debating tournament? Are they producing political expression?

For the cultural analyst of language use, the immediate response to the question of how public expression becomes political expression is a question of point of view: political from whose perspective? Who, indeed, is in the best position to determine whether a strip of public talk counts as political expression? It is possible to advance a cultural view of discourse according to which "all talk is social and political" (Bailey 2007: 271), as all observable talk indexes established sociopolitical and historical relations. This view, however, can lose sight of moments in public talk where participants, using subtle, locally available interactional cues, signal that they have switched to a political mode of expression.

The ethnorhetorical approach (Boromisza-Habashi 2011; Carbaugh and Boromisza-Habashi 2011) was designed to show that local, cultural systems of expression and meaning bring coherence to, and find their own articulation in, rhetorical discourse. Rhetorical discourse is understood as the meaningful use of communicative (especially discursive, symbolic) resources to "shape practical action [and] mold cultural beliefs about communication itself" (Carbaugh and Boromisza-Habashi 2011: 104–5). The term "ethnorhetoric" points to the observation that humans often rely on locally available communicative resources in their attempts to shape human conduct and social relations, and do so within locally observed limits of intelligibility and propriety. Fascination with the order-making capacity of communication is an intellectual orientation the ethnorhetorical approach shares with the Rhetoric Culture project (Tyler and Strecker 2009) and, more broadly speaking, with those who study culture as human praxis (Bauman 1999).

The ethnorhetorical approach maintains that any analytical claim about the meaning of observable rhetorical discourse must represent, as closely as possible, the perspective of the speaker and their speech community. The task of the analyst is to capture locally available communicative resources cultural members use to make sense of, and participate in, social life in particular historical contexts. Cultural symbols (such as key terms and concepts), symbolic forms (such as rituals or social dramas), and the meanings of symbols and symbolic forms (such as basic cultural assumptions, beliefs, and norms) function as resources for sense making and participation (Carbaugh 2007, 2011; Philipsen 1992).

The ethnorhetoric concept suggests a third way to ask the question that serves as the intellectual engine of this chapter: how do public speakers use locally available communicative resources to impose a political order on ongoing communicative action and relevant social relations? Answering this question about a rhetorical strategy requires the study of actual political discourse,

particularly the ethnographically informed study of political expression as the ordering of conduct and social relations (e.g., see Agar 1994; Albert 1972; Bauman and Briggs 2003; Bloch and Lemish 2005; Carbaugh 1988, 1996, 2002; Gal 1991; Huspek and Kendall 1991; Lippi-Green 1997; Urla 1995; Witteborn 2004).

The task of this chapter is to capture one particular, Hungarian resource, the strategic invocation of a communal dilemma (*dilemma* in Hungarian) about hate speech legislation. A second, related task is to reconstruct the local function of this rhetorical strategy. The ethnography of communication (Cameron 2001; Carbaugh 2008; Hymes 1972; Saville-Troike 2003) suggests a theoretically informed approach to social interaction. Ethnographers use theories of communicative activity to notice local activities, strive to interpret the local significance (or insignificance) of those activities, and return to the theory or theories of choice in order to assess their explanatory power in the light of cultural interpretation (Carbaugh and Hastings 1992). The communication activity theory I bring to the analysis of dilemma invocations is the theory of frames. Frames are communicative cues that help participants of the same communicative situation develop a shared definition of the situation and, in interaction, coordinate their communicative activities according to that shared definition (Goffman 1974). What I set out to show is that Hungarian speakers sometimes invoke communal dilemmas in order to frame the ongoing interaction—or an ongoing communicative process beyond the boundaries of a single interaction—as a political one.

What is a "political" frame? How do we know that someone has just invoked one, and that communicative action and social relations in that frame should be regarded as "political"? There are at least two ways to muster evidence for the claim that in a specific communicative process a political frame is active. On the one hand, social groups develop political forums (village or town hall meetings), political identities (elders, senators, or registered party members), and political genres of talk (stump speeches, presidential addresses, the concession speeches of candidates for political office) that are widely recognized as such. Overt reference to these forums, identities, and genres by means of words, spatial arrangements, or visual aids (national flags, Doric columns, balloons, etc.) can be used to frame communicative situations and actions as political. There are, however, more subtle cues at speakers' disposal to switch to a political footing (Goffman 1981) to introduce a markedly political definition of the situation and related communicative action. My goal in this chapter is to show that the invocation of a communal dilemma is a resource to accomplish such a definition.

After a very brief overview of the hate speech debate in Hungary, I investigate the meaning of communal dilemma invocations by highlighting two

relevant contexts in which those invocations take on significance for Hungarian speakers. Borrowing a distinction from Goodwin and Duranti (1992), I first focus on language use as the context of dilemma invocations. This type of analysis seeks to establish the local meanings of linguistic resources (such as the dilemma) by identifying their communicative functions within the context of ongoing social interaction or broader, sequential communicative processes (such as media controversies extended over days or weeks). Second, I discuss how the dilemma acquires meaning, and the dilemma invocation rhetorical force, in what Goodwin and Duranti (1992) call the extrasituational context of language use, the context of interaction constituted by sociocultural background knowledge and broader frames of reference. I discuss one particular sociocultural meaning of the dilemma that informs particular interactions or communicative processes. Finally, I spell out the relationship between political texturing and political participation.

The Hate Speech Debate in Hungary

The wave of concern about hate speech that marked the 1990s in the United States reached Hungary in the early 2000s. That wave was, indeed, a tidal wave: Hungarian political discourse was awash with allegations and counterallegations of "hate speech" (*gyűlöletbeszéd*) by 2003 (see Boromisza-Habashi 2013). Consensus about the meaning of the term was very limited—in fact, many public speakers thrived on the contestation of meanings. It was easy to counter an allegation of hate speech or the interpretation of an act of speaking as hate speech with an allegation or interpretation built on a competing meaning of the term. In broadcast discourse about hate speech between 2003 and 2007, I found forty-four terms speakers used to explicate the meaning of hate speech. *Gyűlöletbeszéd* was discussed as "discrimination" (*kirekesztés*) and "stigmatization" (*megbélyegzés*), as "speech filled with hatred" (*gyűlölettel teli beszéd*), as "a derogatory remark about a group" (*leértékelő kijelentés csoport ellen*), and as "saying outrageous things about Hungarians" (*magyarokról felháborító dolgokat mondani*). These terms were connected by a network of family resemblances, but these resemblances did not bring about any widespread consensus about the meaning of hate speech. Hungarian public speakers agreed about one thing only: hate speech was despicable, and Hungarians needed to do something about it. There was no agreement, however, about exactly why hate speech was so despicable. The term was used to point to a variety of impending social catastrophes that appeared catastrophic only to those who voiced concern about them. Some said hate speech was hurting historically disadvantaged minorities; others maintained that it rendered Hungarian pub-

lic discourse toxic; yet others complained that accusations of hate speech were a political ploy to silence the Hungarian radical Right.

There were some on the political Left, especially among Hungarian Socialists, who made multiple attempts to pass legislation outlawing hate speech as a category of criminal conduct. Champions of the "hate law" (*gyűlölettörvény*) found their vision of social catastrophe being contested by representatives of competing visions. First, not everyone was willing to accept the definition of hate speech as a type of public expression that violated the human dignity of its targets and therefore fell outside the boundaries of free speech. Hungarian free speech advocates saw the hate law as a pernicious attack on civil rights. Second, there was the issue of wildly variable interpretations of what forms of public expression constituted hate speech. A small but vocal group on the Far Right denied the very existence of hate speech as an observable form of expression and worried instead about their own right to uninhibited political expression. Third, the sentiment that some forms of talk constituted criminal behavior conjured up specters of dark national history. Since the late 1800s, most Hungarian political regimes found it necessary to outlaw speech they deemed contrary to their interests (Györgyi 2003). The Habsburg monarchy outlawed public expression challenging the legitimacy of the throne and the royal succession. After the 1919 Communist uprising, which temporarily brought Hungary into Bolshevik Russia's domain of influence, the Kingdom of Hungary outlawed all "slander against the [Hungarian] nation" (*nemzetrágalmazás*). When in the wake of the Vienna Awards Hungary annexed parts of present-day Ukraine, Slovakia, and Romania, a 1941 law ruled against derogatory public expression directed at ethnic minorities. After World War II, a variety of laws prohibited public criticism of the Socialist state. Proponents of the hate law tried to cultivate an alternative, but equally sinister, history of hate speech legislation. Such legislation, they argued, would acknowledge one of the most important historical lessons from the Holocaust, namely, that hateful expression is the harbinger of crimes against humanity. This alternative history, however, did not manage to mute its competitor.

Language Use as Context: The Rhetorical Strategy of Invoking a Dilemma

After the demise of state socialism, Hungary's turn toward the European Union and the growing influence of the human rights discourse permeating EU social policy reinvigorated the Hungarian Left's quest for the hate law. The three excerpts discussed in this section are all concerned with, in one way or another, the possibility of legal sanctions against *gyűlöletbeszéd*.

In 2005, Péter Bárándy, a former Socialist minister of justice and one of the most prominent advocates of the hate law, was interviewed on the influential political television program *Nap-Kelte* (Sunrise). Toward the end of the interview, Bárándy (PB) brought up one of hate law advocates' most widely used arguments: those who value absolute freedom of speech over the protection of human dignity fail to appreciate that the Holocaust began with the public expression of hatred. Starting on line 14, the interviewer (IR) resisted the implicit argument that passing the hate law was a matter of legal or moral necessity. (Note that references to line numbers refer to the Hungarian original. All translations are the author's own.)

Excerpt 1, *Nap-Kelte* (*Vendégasztal*), 9 August 2005, 06:08

1	PB	a jog is és az erkölcs is	*Law and morality both reach*
2		elérkezik	
3	IR	Mhm	*Mhm*
4	PB	saját határához ennél a	*their own limits with regard to*
5		kérdéskörnél és a viták	*this issue, and the debates*
6		azok akkor ö	*seem to be decided*
7		látszanak úgy eldőlni hogy inkább	*in favor of*
8		a szólásszabadság mintsem az	*freedom of speech rather than*
9		emberi méltóság amikor az emberi	*human dignity when human*
10		feledékenység eljut arra a határra	*forgetfulness reaches a point*
11		amikor már nem emlékszik	*where it can no longer recall*
12		arra hogy minden a szavakkal	*that everything begins with*
13		kezdődik. ((smiles))	*words.*
14	IR	Én tökéletesen értem sokan	*I understand perfectly, many*
15		értik ami ön mond de akkor	*understand what you are saying*
16		amikor a szavakkal kezdődtek a	*but when things started with*
17		dolgok és csak toporgott a jog	*words the law just hesitated, and*
18		később amikor már a	*later when forgetting, as you*
19		ö feledés ahogy ön mondta be	*said, had hidden these beginning*
20		ö fedte ezeket a kezdeti időket	*times from view, the law only*
21		akkor is tétován toporog a jog	*hesitated.*
22		és lehet hogy ezt egyszerűen	*And it is possible that even if*
23		a jog eszközeivel még ha	*this ought to be solved by*
24		kellene sem lehet megoldani.	*legal means it cannot be done.*
25	PB	Nézze ez	*Look, this*
26	IR	Nem tudom, kérdezem	*I don't know this, I'm just*
27			*asking.*
28	PB	Az emberölés	*The prohibition of murder*
29		tilalmazását sem lehet csak a jog	*cannot be solved solely*

30		eszközeivel megodani. Semmit sem	*by legal means. Nothing can be*
31		lehet csak a jog eszközeivel	*solved solely by legal means,*
32		megoldani, a jog egy	*the law is a*
33		eszköz. ön is így fogalmazott,	*tool, as you put it as well*
34	IR	Így van.	*That's correct.*
35	PB	én is mindig így fogalmazok.	*and I always say so myself.*
36	IR	Igen.	*Yes.*
37	PB	Egy fajta szerszámkészlettel	*It is equipped with a certain set*
38		rendelkezik ami mindennek a	*of tools that cannot be*
39		megoldására nem alkalmas. Nincs	*used to solve everything. There*
40		olyan bűncselekmény kategória amit	*is no category of criminal acts*
41		csak a jog eszközével	*that can be prevented solely*
42		tudunk elhárítani mondom a	*by legal means, as I said*
43		legsúlyosabb emberöléstől	*including the gravest murder*
44	IR	Jó csak	*Okay, but*
45	PB	a becsületsértésen keresztül	*including libel*
46	IR	bocsásson meg a ortodox jogászok	*I'm sorry, among orthodox lawyers*
47	PB	a lopásig.	*all the way to theft.*
48	IR	ortodox jogászok között ezt most	*among orthodox lawyers, and I say*
49		leíró értelemben használom	*this in a descriptive, not an*
50		nem minősítve azért látszik	*evaluative way, I can see*
51		egy olyanfajta törekvés hogy egy	*an attempt to squeeze*
52		véges rendszerbe belegyömöszöljük	*infinite reality into a finite*
53		a végtelen valóságot.	*system.*
54	PB	((smiles)) Igen azt hiszem hogy ez	*Yes, I don't believe that this is*
55		nem egy helyes ö jogászi	*an appropriate attitude among*
56		felfogás	*lawyers.*
57	IR	Ö ezt azért vetem föl mert	*I am raising this [issue] because*
58		miután az erkölcsnek is és a	*both morality and law must face*
59		jognak is ö valóságos	*actual dilemmas here*
60		dilemmákkal kell itt szembenézni	
61		és valóságos értékek	*and actual values exist in a*
62		feszülnek egybe. Ezenközbe azt	*relationship of tension, however*
63		tapasztalom hogy a	*what I'm noticing is that the*
64		gyűlölettörvényről szóló beszéd	*recycling of talk about the hate*
65		ö időnként ö történő	*law from time to time serves as a*
66		elővétele politikai	*vehicle for political*
67		manipulációkra ad alkalmat.	*manipulation.*
68		Ezt olykor mintha	*It seems that this [law]*
69		tudatosan dobnák be akkor amikor	*is placed on the agenda when*
70		lehet hogy másról kellene beszélni	*perhaps we should be talking*

71		olykor provokációszámba megy	*about something else, and*
72		a másik oldalról ennek a	*sometimes the other side seems to*
73		nagyon durva ö azt mondanám	*provoke [the former] by denying*
74		hogy inkább ö intellektuálisan	*[the legitimacy of the law] in an*
75		vagy erkölcsileg érzéketlen	*intellectually or morally*
76		tagadása. Mindenesetre mind a	*insensitive manner. In any event,*
77		két oldal számára lehetővé teszi	*this gives both sides a chance to*
78		hogy olyan politikai	*play such political games under*
79		játszmákat játszanak le ennek	*this pretense*
80		örvén aminek se jogi se	*that otherwise have neither legal*
81		erkölcsi alapja egyébként nem	*nor moral*
82		lehetne.	*foundations.*
83	PB	Ez így van de sajnos azt kell	*This is true, but unfortunately we*
84		látni hogy minden valamirevaló	*have to recognize that all*
85		kérdést azt föl lehet	*worthwhile issues can be used in*
86		használni demagóg	*the service of demagogic*
87		politikai érdekek	*political interests, which*
88		érvényesítésére ettől még az a	*does not mean that a worthwhile*
89		valamirevaló kérdés valamirevaló	*issue is no longer a worthwhile*
90		kérdés marad csak legfeljebb	*issue, it only becomes smeared in*
91		besározódik hogyha a pártok	*the hands of political parties.*
92		kezére kerül. De az egy	*But it's interesting how [views*
93		érdekes dolog egyébként ez a	*on] hate speech versus freedom of*
94		gyűlöletbeszéd szólásszabadság ez	*speech become something like*
95		szinte ilyen hitkérdéssé	*articles of faith.*
96		vált. Pont a múltkor egy e	*Just the other day I was sitting*
97		témakörben nagyon sokszor	*next to a public figure who had*
89		megnyilvánult közszereplővel	*voiced an opinion on this matter*
99		ültünk egymás mellett ő az	*numerous times, whose views on*
100		ellentétes póluson helyezkedik	*this issue are located at the*
101		el ebben a kérdésben és	*pole opposite to mine, and we*
102		végigvettük hogy tulajdonképpen	*realized that we agreed on almost*
103		majdnem mindenben vagy mindenben	*everything, everything actually,*
104		egyetértünk ebben viszont	*but our convictions about this*
105		meggyőzhetetlenek vagyunk	*are completely resistant to*
106		egymással szemben.	*persuasion.*
107	IR	A hitet ez ügyben is	*We respect faith in this case as*
108		tiszteljük az eredményt meg	*in any other, and we are looking*
109		várjuk köszönöm szépen.	*forward to the outcome, thank you*
110			*very much [for the interview].*

In what sense is this exchange political? We can point to some aspects of the conversation's context to make the case that what we see here is an example of political expression. *Nap-Kelte* was a political television program widely recognized for its political influence. The interviewee is a former politician advocating the political agenda of the Hungarian Socialist Party. The interview's conversational structure does in no way deviate from the widely accepted political interview format. A central topic of the exchange is the "political games" Hungarian politicians play with one another instead of tackling "worthwhile issues."

However, there is more "politics" to this exchange than immediately meets the eye. Notice that at the beginning of the excerpt (lines 1, 4–13) the interviewee adopts a critical stance toward those who deny that "everything begins with words." In the context of an ongoing, fierce political debate with no end in sight—such as the Hungarian hate law debate—to claim that one side is right and the other is wrong is a move that introduces an absolute normative standard against which the conduct and positions of participants can be evaluated. To "forget" about the role of public words in genocide, Bárándy suggests, is a sign not only of historical amnesia but also of irresponsible lawmaking.

The interviewer challenges the validity of this stance on two fronts after acknowledging that the stance is recognized and shared by "many" (line 15). The first challenge is a technical one: the law is not a panacea. It sometimes "hesitates" when it should act (line 21), and it cannot by itself eradicate the social evils it was designed to address (lines 22–24). Bárándy concedes that "[n]othing can be solved solely by legal means" (lines 30–31). The interviewer's second challenge targets "orthodox lawyers" who seek to "squeeze infinite reality into a finite system" (lines 48–53). It is possible to interpret this somewhat cryptic comment as a synopsis of the interviewer's technical challenge (i.e., that the law has limited efficacy in response to complex social ills), and it is likely that Bárándy's agreement on lines 54–56 draws on this interpretation. The interviewer's "I'm raising this because" (line 57) clarifies that he is moving past the technical challenge to a related but different issue and challenge. The interviewer suggests that the "actual dilemmas" (line 59) and "tension" between "values" (lines 61–62) must not be overlooked, but that is exactly what Hungarian politicians are doing as they play their "political games" (line 78) with the hate law. This second challenge targets Bárándy's position in two ways. First, it calls into question the existence of the legal and moral absolutes Bárándy invoked at the beginning of the excerpt; second, it implicates Bárándy, a former politician, in morally objectionable "political games."

The interviewer's invocation of "actual dilemmas" (*valóságos dilemmák*) merits closer examination. It is not immediately clear what the interviewer means by "dilemmas." We learn that this is a dilemma that morality and the

law must face. We also learn that the dilemma is related, in one way or another, to "actual values exist[ing] in a relationship of tension" (lines 61–62). It is clear that the dilemma discussed here is different from ideological and interactional dilemmas discussed in the discourse analytic and ethnography of communication literature. These lines of scholarship are primarily concerned with dilemmas that *individual* social actors face in moments of negotiating contradictions in their system of values and beliefs and ideologies (Billig et al. 1988; Carbaugh 1988; Fitch 1998), when they face a difficult choice between socially consequential communicative goals, acts, or strategies (Tracy 1997, 2010; Tracy and Ashcraft 2001; Tracy and Baratz 1993), or when they feel that they cannot satisfactorily match their ideals to their communicative practices (e.g., Aakhus 2001; Guttman 2007). The interviewer's dilemma invocation, however, suggests that the agent negotiating a dilemma-ridden situation is not any particular individual, but a collective comprising all lawmakers involved in the political debates surrounding the hate law. (Morality and the law do not "face dilemmas"—humans arguing over them do.) This reading of a dilemma implies competing political and normative positions within the collective and a social necessity to choose between such positions. Cultural analysis may of course reveal that a dilemma carries within it ideological dilemmas, inconsistencies, or contradictions, but the dilemmas the interviewer brings into view highlight moral and legal rather than ideological tensions.

The meaning of a term is its function in interaction (Sanders 2005). The invocation of "actual dilemmas" prompts Bárándy to tell a story (lines 96–106) that "is responsive to both the immediate local context and the social projects that participants are engaged in" (Goodwin 1990/91: 263): "Just the other day I was sitting next to a public figure who had voiced an opinion on this matter numerous times, whose views on this issue are located at the pole opposite to mine, and we realized that we agreed on almost everything, everything actually, but our convictions about this are completely resistant to persuasion." This story serves as the illustration of the claim that "[views on] hate speech versus freedom of speech become something like articles of faith" (lines 92–95). In this we see the story responding to the immediate context. The larger social project is one that the interviewer initiated by challenging Bárándy's absolutist position. Bárándy completes this social project by accepting that his position on the hate law is but one position staunchly contested by those who wish to honor freedom of speech by opposing the law against hate speech. Bárándy and the interviewer thus collaborate on maneuvering a speaker, Bárándy, into a political position.

It is important to note that before Bárándy accepts the political positioning of himself and his agenda, he preempts the conclusion that, as an advocate of the hate law, he is just another politician playing "political games." To the in-

terviewer's charge that both the proposed hate law and opposition to it tend to be vehicles of political games, Bárándy responds that "unfortunately we have to recognize that all worthwhile issues can be used in the service of demagogic political interests, which does not mean that a worthwhile issue is no longer a worthwhile issue, it only becomes smeared in the hands of political parties" (lines 83–91). Bárándy signals that he locates himself and his position on the hate law outside the realm of political parties and their ongoing "games," and that he represents an authentic political view.

Using the language of frame analysis, we can say that by line 106 Bárándy and the interviewer successfully align their definitions of the situation. The interviewer initiated a political framing of Bárándy's position by invoking "actual dilemmas," and Bárándy accepted the frame under the condition that his political stance would be understood to fall beyond the grime of party politics. On lines 107–110 the interviewer ceases his challenges and pledges to "respect faith in this case as in any other." The frame alignment is thus complete.

The analysis so far illustrates that one important function of invoking a communal dilemma in Hungarian public expression is that it can be used to place the ongoing interaction into a political frame. As a result, participants' political relations are discursively highlighted. Let us see another example of such an invocation. Excerpt 2 was taken from the transcript of a talk show on a state-sponsored radio station. The host of the talk show invited two expert guests, political scientist János Simon and sociologist András Kovács, to answer his own and callers' questions about hate speech. Throughout the program, Simon and Kovács were in disagreement about the defining features of hate speech. Kovács argued for a minimalist definition according to which only particular types of content constituted hate speech; Simon advocated for a broader definition. The following excerpt shows Simon (JS) responding to one of Kovács's (AK) principal arguments—that defamatory public expression directed at one's political opponent should not count as hate speech—and invoking a communal dilemma (line 43).

Excerpt 2, *Szóljon hozzá!*, 24 September 2003, part 1, 14:12

1	AK	Azt gondolom hogy a az	*I think that political speech*
2		emóciókra öö apelláló	*appealing to the emotions*
3		politikai beszéd az nem tartozik	*does not belong to the category*
4		a gyűlöletbeszéd kategóriájába,	*of hate speech,*
5		akkor sem tartozik ha	*not even when politicians say*
6		kemény dolgot mondanak egymásról	*really rough things about one*
7		a politikusok hogyha az egyik	*another, when one*
8		azt mondja a másikról hogy	*says that the other*
9		hazudott vagy ha azt mondja	*lied or is leading the country*

10		hogy ö ö romlásba dönti az	*into destruction.*
11		országot. Lehet hogy ez nem igaz	*It is possible that this is not*
12		nem hazudott és nem dönti	*true, that the other is not*
13		romlásba de ez akor sem	*lying and is not leading the*
14		gyűlöletbeszéd. Ha valaki azt	*country into destruction, but*
15		mondja hogy ne	*it's still not hate speech. When*
16		szavazzál ikszre mert az egy	*someone says, don't vote for X*
17		szőröstalpú móc akkor ez	*because [he or she] is a hairy-*
18		már a gyűlöletbeszéd	*healed Móc [ethnic slur*
19		kategóriájába tartozik.	*targeting Romanians], that*
			belongs to the category of hate
			speech.
20		((9 turns omitted))	
21	JS	Így hirtelen az jutott eszembe	*So this reminds me of the time*
22		hogy a nyolcvanas évek	*when in the mid-eighties I was*
23		közepén egy évig Mexikóban voltam	*studying in Mexico for a year,*
24		az egyetemen, és amikor	*and two or three days after I*
25		megérkeztem ö második vagy	*arrived in the country I got*
26		harmadik napon egy Volkswagen	*into a Volkswagen cab, a little*
27		taxiba, kis bogárba	*Beetle,*
28		ültem, ö leintettem az úton	*I flagged it down and I got in,*
29		és beültem és horogkereszt lógott	*and a swastika was hanging there*
30		a taxiban meg fasiszta jelképek	*and other Fascist symbols, and I*
31		voltak. S elkezdtem félni.	*started to feel fear,*
32		Szó szerint fizikailag félni,	*literally, physical fear,*
33		ömert alapvetően számomra	*because basically this is what*
34		ilyen dolgot gerjesztett ez a,	*it generated, very bad memories,*
35		nagyon rossz emlékeket és	*and I could hardly wait for the*
36		alig vártam hogy vége legyen az	*trip to be over.*
37		útnak. Ö s önmagában a	*So symbols themselves can*
38		jelképek is ö gerjeszthetnek	*generate*
39		félelmet. Tehát nem	*fear, I mean*
40		feltétlen kell ahhoz hogy valaki	*it is not necessary to give a*
41		mondjon beszédet de a	*speech, symbols themselves can*
42		jelképek önmagukban gerjeszetenek	*generate fear.*
43		félelmet. Egy nagy dilemma	*It is a big dilemma*
44		nemzetközileg hogy engedélyezzék-	*internationally whether [such*
45		e vagy se, hol van a határa a	*symbols] should be allowed,*
46		szólásszabadságnak és a	*where the boundaries of freedom*
47		véleménynyilvánításnak	*of speech and freedom of opinion*
48			*are.*

Here, the invocation of the communal dilemma has a somewhat different meaning-in-use than in excerpt 1. Simon's dilemma invocation on line 43 places his disagreement with Kovács into the context of a "big international dilemma" about the "boundaries of freedom of speech and freedom of opinion" and about how drawing those boundaries shapes related legislation. This dilemma is not an individual dilemma—it is one negotiated by those representing various positions on the boundaries of free speech. The invocation of the dilemma depersonalizes the disagreement: the focus shifts from the disagreement to the dilemma, and thus the invocation allows Simon to preemptively protect his own solidarity face—the positive image of oneself as a likable person (Lim and Bowers 1991)—from the charge that he is personally attacking Kovács for his views. This disagreement is not "about" Simon, Kovács, and their interpersonal relationship, Simon seems to suggest. Rather, their disagreement is an enactment of the international dilemma that existed prior to the talk show and will continue to exist after the show is over.

But there is more facework performed here. By invoking the dilemma, Simon activates a political frame within which he enters into a political relationship with Kovács. In such a relationship, it is permissible for conversational partners equally concerned about hate speech to become advocates of two horns of the same dilemma and to represent irreconcilable positions. The dilemma thus levels the intellectual playing field between the opponents. This move is designed to protect Simon's competence face (the positive image of oneself as a competent person), as his stubborn opposition to Kovács's position is rendered plausible by the presence of the dilemma.

The political frame Simon introduces is ratified by the host, who, immediately after the end of excerpt 2, adds that some would even argue that the very debate about the legality of certain political symbols can generate fear in some audiences. Dilemmas exist, and sometimes dilemmas are but one horn of a related but different dilemma, suggests the host. The host's contribution affirms that the formation of complex political relations is an inevitable outcome of advocacy organized around these dilemmas.

Concerns about hate speech in Hungarian society and related dilemma invocations are observable in other processes of Hungarian public communication, notably in journalism. On 20 August 2001, the Calvinist pastor and then member of Parliament Lóránt Hegedűs Jr. published a highly controversial article in a district newsletter of his political party MIÉP (Hungarian Justice and Life Party). The article warned Hungarians that unless they exclude Jews from Hungarian society, Jews would exclude them. The open call for the exclusion of one of the most prominent ethnic groups in Hungary resulted in a firestorm of criticism and a lawsuit against Hegedűs for incitement against

a community. In the context of Hungarian hate speech debates, the Hegedűs affair developed into the archetypal example of *gyűlöletbeszéd.*

On 6 September the daily newspaper *Magyar Hírlap* published the article in its entirety. The following day, the online edition of the paper published an editorial justifying the decision to publish the controversial text.

Excerpt 3, "A harag papja," *Magyar Hírlap,* 7 September 2001

1	Örök dilemma, hogy valamely helyi	*It is an eternal dilemma whether it*
2	orgánumban vagy a zugsajtóban	*is justifiable to give greater*
3	megjelent szöveget, bármennyire	*publicity to a revolting and*
4	fölháborító és tűrhetetlen, szabad-	*intolerable text published in the*
5	e beemelni a nagy nyilvánosságba,	*local or the gutter press, even*
6	egyértelmű elítélése mellett is	*while signaling the unequivocal*
7	növelve annak publicitását. Tegnapi	*rejection of its contents. In*
8	számunkban a közlés mellett	*yesterday's edition we decided to do*
9	döntöttünk, mert az üzenet minden	*so because the message is more*
10	eddiginél fertelmesebb—mert	*heinous than ever: it incites*
11	nyíltan uszító —, és mert egy	*openly, and it was signed by the*
12	parlamenti párt alelnöke írta, név	*vice chairman of a political party,*
13	szerint ifjabb Hegedűs Lóránt.	*notably Lóránt Hegedűs Jr.*
14	((discussion of article's	
15	discriminatory contents))	
16	Meggyőződésünk, hogy ebben az	*We believe that in a case like this*
17	esetben már a politikai	*the political stigmatization of and*
18	megbélyegzés és elhatárolódás is	*distancing oneself from the*
19	kevés. Itt a lelkész-képviselő	*perpetrator are not enough. The next*
21	büntetőjogi felelősségre vonásának	*step is to press criminal charges*
22	kell következnie.	*against the pastor-MP must follow.*
23	Ifjabb Hegedűs Lórántot—nem	*Lóránt Hegedűs Jr. ought to face an*
24	nézeteiért, hanem írásban	*independent court, not for his views*
25	elkövetett tettéért—kell a	*but for acts committed in writing.*
26	független bíróság elé állítani.	

It is not clear from this excerpt or the full editorial whether it was written in response to critical voices objecting to the publication of the Hegedűs text or in anticipation of such critical comments. In either case, the dilemma invocation paints the picture of a moral and political battlefield where selecting sides and politically committed action are not only meaningful and appropriate acts, but also urgent necessities. The necessity derives from the "heinousness" (line 10) of what Hegedűs committed to paper. In the context of the

dilemma, any response to the "heinous" act is likely to scandalize those who respond on the basis of contrary moral convictions, particularly those who believe that republishing a controversial text places it in the journalistic echo chamber and multiplies not only the size of its audience but also its potential impact on that audience. The editorial casts the publication of the Hegedűs text as an act of marshaling evidence for Hegedűs's culpability. Again, the irresolvable ("eternal," line 1) tension between relevant values and related political positions may be informed by ideological dilemma, but such dilemmas are not of concern to the author (or authors) of this editorial. The dilemma they invoke is communal; its invocation is designed to render the public criticism of the paper's choice a political act that invites a political response.

In sum, dilemma invocations accomplish a political definition of the situation by positing three types of tensions participants of dilemma-ridden situations are forced to negotiate: no absolute normative standards for action exist, yet action to prevent the catastrophic consequences of hate speech is a must; positions from which recommended courses of action are formulated stand in opposition, but both of those positions are equally principled and coherent; relevant participants represent conflicting political positions, but their disagreement is not only appropriate but inevitable in the context of the dilemma.

Extrasituational Context: The Cultural Meaning of the Dilemma

In itself, the discourse analysis of frames cannot take us close enough to the widely shared and deeply felt cultural norms and premises that lend rhetorical force to political frames. It is possible to gain a deeper understanding of what a dilemma means in the context of this interaction by looking beyond the immediately available exchange to the extrasituational context. In the limited space provided, I can merely illustrate the significance of such meanings.

Let us return to excerpt 1. It is not clear from the interviewer's talk what particular dilemmas he had in mind in the moment. We can, however, investigate what dilemma Bárándy *understood* as the one the interviewer had in mind. From an interactional perspective, Bárándy's inference constitutes *the* relevant meaning of the dilemma. The dilemma Bárándy addressed is the one that pitted advocates of the hate law against free speech absolutists. In a cultural discourse analysis of the 2003 debates of the hate law in Hungarian parliamentary committee meetings (Boromisza-Habashi 2007), I established that arguments on constitutional grounds for and against the hate law placed lawmakers into irreconcilable political and moral positions. The language of

the pre-2011 Hungarian Constitution was ambiguous about the relationship between two fundamental human rights: "human dignity" (*emberi méltóság*) and freedom of speech or, in the language of Hungarian constitutional law, the "freedom of expressing opinions" (*véleménynyilvánítás szabadsága*). Lawmakers agreed that hate speech constituted a violation of human dignity, but they remained divided about whether or not that violation was adequate grounds for declaring hate speech to be a form of public expression beyond the boundaries of free speech. The disagreement could be boiled down to two similar but competing positions:

> 1. Hate speech violates the human dignity of others. Human dignity is protected by the constitution. The freedom of expression is also protected by the constitution. Since the right to human dignity and the right to free expression are both within the constitution, one can serve as the limit to the other. ... Therefore, hate speech is a mode of expression not protected by the constitution.
>
> 2. Hate speech violates the human dignity of others. Human dignity is protected by the constitution. The freedom of expression is also protected by the constitution. Since the right to human dignity and the right to free expression are both within the constitution, one cannot be compromised for the sake of the other. Therefore, hate speech is a mode of expression protected by the constitution.

These positions led lawmakers to reach contrasting conclusions about the proper course of action against hate speech in Hungarian society. Proponents of the argument that hate speech did not deserve constitutional protection argued for placing additional constraints on the freedom of speech, whereas the critics of this argument argued against the expansion of constraints. None of the lawmakers expressed any uncertainty about which side of the argument they supported. The cultural analysis of their arguments showed that members of Parliament argued on the basis of deeply held cultural beliefs about the status of persons as "citizens." Those who endorsed the first proposition talked about the citizen as a communal member with responsibilities toward other communal members. Advocates of the second proposition saw the citizen as an individual endowed with individual rights. As a collective, however, lawmakers were concerned that the resolution of the dilemma might not be possible. Indeed, a paradox at the heart of the debate precluded any possible resolution: imposing legal restrictions on the freedom of speech to prevent hate speech would have led to curtailing citizens' fundamental human rights, as would have not doing so.

To summarize, the dilemma in excerpt 1 and among Hungarian lawmakers was a dilemma only from the collective's perspective; pitted different interpretations of the constitution against one another; generated competing recommendations for an ideal course of action; was informed by deeply held cultural beliefs about personhood; and derived its poignancy from a cultural paradox. By referring to such dilemmas as communal I wish to emphasize not only that they appeared to be dilemmas from the collective's perspective, but also that they are informed by cultural, communal meanings. It is possible that the communal dilemmas invoked in excerpts 2 and 3 share some cultural meanings with the one discussed here, but this cannot be taken as a given.

Retexturing Communicative Action

The dilemma invocation as a rhetorical strategy in Hungarian public discourse about hate speech (*gyűlöletbeszéd*) draws on cultural communicative resources to respond to what speakers see as impending social catastrophe: the prospect of injustice and violence engendered by hate speech. The strategy entails defining the ongoing communicative situation as political and exposing relevant, recalcitrant moral positions to contestation. Public speakers who suggest (or concede) that interpretations of, and moral or legal responses to, hate speech are dilemma-ridden activate a definition of the situation in which no morally informed social or political position can be treated as absolute. The positions themselves remain valid, but they are presented as choices available to public actors against the background of conflict and deep cultural difference.

To pick up on a unifying theme of this volume, dilemma invocations are designed to alter the texture of ongoing interaction by attempting to braid the thread of political engagement to more dominant, thicker threads, such as moral and legal absolutes and the political identities associated with the act of professing those absolutes. The context-bound, strategic retexturing of communicative action thus involves more than interactional framing in Goffman's sense of the term. In addition to imposing a political definition on ongoing social interaction, a speaker invoking a dilemma taps into contested cultural meanings and paradoxes that have existed prior to the exchange and will continue to exist once the exchange is concluded. The speaker also conjures up the history of heated exchanges about hate speech and visions of social catastrophe that have lent, and will continue to lend, a sense of urgency to the related tasks of defining and responding to hate speech.

A cultural approach to the political retexturing of ongoing interaction suggests interpreting communal dilemma invocations as attempts to foster a

politics of discursive space (Fischer 2006). Treating political, moral, and legal positions on an issue as open to contestation is itself a microlevel political move. In the excerpts discussed in this chapter, Hungarian public speakers strive to open up spaces for continued political engagement relative to a different discursive space populated by moral or legal positions that are presented as uncontestable and absolute. The interviewer and Bárándy (excerpt 1) collaborate on undermining an absolute position Bárándy expressed earlier. In excerpt 2, Simon presents his position and his opponent's as two horns of a dilemma. The editors of *Magyar Hírlap* in excerpt 3 acknowledge that their decision to publish a highly controversial text is contestable in the context of a communal dilemma. These speakers seek to carve out a space for political discourse in which more than one position can be meaningfully and defensibly claimed by Hungarian public speakers who feel compelled to join the national debate about what hate speech is and what can be done about it. A discursive space that recognizes the inevitability of contestation realizes a deliberative minimum in the sense that contestation sustains social issues and concerns about them (Fraser 1990), denies the legitimacy of absolute points of view (Benhabib 1996), and floats the possibility of communicative engagement among representatives of competing viewpoints (Dryzek 2000).

We have no reason to believe, however, that the retexturing of interaction in the hope of cultivating a political discursive space will inevitably accomplish a deliberative minimum. Three types of constraints temper the rhetorical force of dilemma invocations: the sheer recalcitrance of ideological positions, the lack of a unified terrain for political engagement, and the failure of political liberalism in contemporary Hungary. First, many Hungarian political actors are quick to unbraid the thread of political engagement from the texture of the hate speech debates. There are those deeply invested in one ideological position as opposed to another they see as misinformed or malicious (Boromisza-Habashi 2010, 2013); others call into question the impending social catastrophe itself (Boromisza-Habashi 2011).

Second, positing a communal dilemma seeks to reduce the number of available political positions on hate speech to two. The attempt to reduce Hungarian hate speech debates to a single, community-wide debate, and to define that debate as *the* terrain of political engagement, disregards the sociopolitical complexity of those debates. While some contested an opponent's interpretation of what forms of expression counted as hate speech, others debated the identity of the targets of hate speech or the value of legal sanctions. Additionally, for some, "joining the hate speech debate" did not mean commitment to sustained participation in the debate, but rather an opportunity to call attention to what they saw as moral panic over a contrived issue. Yet others suggested that, far from being an issue of national importance, hate speech was

the concern of particular interest groups such as minorities, political bodies such as the European Union and particular Hungarian political parties, or journalists desperate to fill the news cycle. On the Hungarian political scene, "debating" hate speech can only mean joining one debate and not joining others. Hence, the rhetoric of positing a single debate that organizes the whole community into a coherent polity conflicts with Hungarian political reality.

Third, political liberalism, the ideological source of the belief in the value of discursive political engagement as a means of social progress, is virtually absent from the contemporary Hungarian political scene. The country experienced a brief moment of liberal political euphoria around the time of the fall of state socialism. All political actors of any consequence spoke the language of freedoms, equal rights, and engagement (Hegedűs 2005). However, by the end of the 1990s it became clear that new democratic institutions could not bring about immediate, radical, and lasting social transformation. Successive governments focused virtually all of their efforts on economic reform and attracting foreign investment (Fabry 2011). Economic "structural adjustment" ravaged standards of living, and institutionalized politics devolved into a competition for power between various factions of the ruling class (Tamás 2008). In the current political context, calls for engagement in the name of social progress are drowned out by calls for order in the name of economic progress.

Gauging the efficacy of the dilemma invocation as microlevel political action is beyond the scope of this study. The present chapter responds to the call issued by the editors of this volume to study the surface or texture of political action as a rich source of insight into sociocultural and historical context. I analyzed and interpreted a Hungarian communicative resource for locally meaningful rhetorical strategy and political action, the dilemma invocation. This work reveals that sometimes speakers—motivated by a sense of social catastrophe—tap into cultural resources to lend a political texture to ongoing communication. Designed to accomplish a deliberative minimum and to plant the seed of political engagement between political actors who represent incompatible political or moral positions, such retexturing is best seen as a micropolitics of hope.

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